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Charged with indifference to women's interests, Gilder would
reply that the female's true interests depend on allowing the male to
develop a healthy sexual identity. This will not sound strange to the
millions of women in this and past generations who have spent their
lives following the advice that Gilder offers. But sociology and economics tell us that if current trends threaten to dissolve the bonds
that check male aggression, we will have to find other ways to preserve those bonds. Today's small families do not occupy anyone's
full-time attention for more than a brief period. Even if the woman
happily accepts the role of mother in the home, she will naturally
seek other outlets eventually, and jobs are society's measures of
worth. In any event, women have been entering the workforce in
increasing numbers since 1964, and it was predictable that as oneearner families became two-earner families, living costs and new
minimum standards of the good life would rise to meet new income
levels. For most families, the choices Gilder urges are not realistically available. Still, it is not easy to resist the thought that Gilder
is on to something when one sees the divorce statistics, and the daily
reports linking the persistence of poverty and high crime rates to
single parent families. We can learn from Gilder even while rejecting some of his arguments and innuendoes.

GENDER JUSTICE. By David L. Kirp,1 Mark G. Yudof,2
Marlene S. Franks.3 Chicago, 11.: University of Chicago
Press. 1986. Pp. x, 296. $19.95.
Suzanna Sherry4
Gender Justice is an avowedly liberal tract on the problems of
gender discrimination in our society. It seeks to provide an alternative to the visions of both conservatives and radical feminists. The
book fails in its liberal mission for some of the same reasons that the
new breed of Democrats cannot seem to raise much of a challenge
to the Republican ideology currently sweeping the country. The
authors endorse many of the policies advocated by conservativesthey reject affirmative action and comparable worth, for examplebut they do so by means of a liberal, process-oriented approach.
l. Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy, and Lecturer, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
2. Dean and James A. Elkins Centennial Chair, University of Texas Law School.
3. Ph.D. candidate, University of California, Berkeley.
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The book thus fails to engage either conservative or radical feminist
critics of liberalism on their own terms. The result is a watereddown liberalism which neither satisfies the needs of women nor
meets the conservative anti-feminist premises head-on.
The authors explicitly set out their traditional liberal approach
in chapter one. Liberal society is process oriented in that results
matter less than the method by which results are obtained, and individualist in that the correct process is unfettered personal choice.
What is most important is that the government "should not be fostering ... 'good lives' by imposing a particular conception of virtue
on the minority."s In other words, "(l]iberty is concerned with the
process of choice, not its outcomes . . . ."6 The authors describe
both conservative and radical feminist theories, by contrast, as result oriented: such a society "deliberately defines the good life for
its members. "7
This dichotomy between a pluralist society in which each individual chooses among competing visions of the good and virtuous
life, and a society in which the community itself shapes and enforces
a dominant view of the good life, is the paradigmatic difference between modem Lockean liberalism and classical pre-Enlightenment
republicanism. Two major features distinguish classical republicanism from its ideological successor, liberalism. First, republicans
conceived of the society in organic terms, as an independent entity,
apart from its members. The common good was thus distinct from,
and paramount to, the good of individuals, who might be expected
to repress their own selfish desires for the common good. To foster
the self-restraint necessary for individuals to subordinate their own
interests to the good of the state, republicanism relied on its second
distinguishing feature: an emphasis on individual capacity for civic
virtue, on which public virtue ultimately rested. Republicanism
thus reflected a moral theory congruent with that of Aristotle and
Aquinas, and rarely invoked by modem philosophers. It is a theory
of individual virtue and aspiration, an example of what Ronald
Dworkin calls a "goal-based" theory: the goal for which both individuals and governments strive is the attainment of virtue. Virtue,
or the good life, is both identifiable and attainable. Government is a
deliberative process engaged in the conscious selection of values.
Modem liberalism-especially as portrayed in this book-rejects both community and virtue, placing the individual and indi5. D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE 135 (1986) [hereinafter
GENDER JUSTICE] (quoting Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113,
117 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978)).
6. /d. at 134.
7. /d. at 23.
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vidual rights at the center. The community is merely a collection of
individuals. The end of government is not to promote virtue but to
secure individual liberty, allowing each individual to define his own
values. A liberal society is thus quintessentially individualist and
pluralist, and the authors of Gender Justice repeatedly stress the importance of governmental nurturance of diverse individual value
choices. Unfortunately, they do not provide a convincing justification for preferring radical individualism to virtue. Instead, they
take refuge in moral relativism, the last resort of those who seek to
reject teleological moral theories. The first chapter canvasses the
myriad "principled" approaches that various contemporary philosophers apply to the problems of gender, and concludes that because
there is no consensus as to the correct approach, the search must be
abandoned in favor of individual resolution.s
This failure to meet the challenge of the conservative and feminist reliance on teleological or virtue-based morality is the book's
greatest weakness. Those who agree with the authors that neither
the conservative nor the radical feminist vision of gender policy is
truly gender justice must first recognize the increasing bankruptcy
of the liberal paradigm. The liberal emphasis on autonomy to the
virtual exclusion of community, and its insistence that only individual moral choices count, leads to an impoverished perception of
human beings. We are inescapably both autonomous individuals
and members of communities, and any approach that fails to accord
sufficient attention to our social nature is thereby inadequate. Perhaps the growing dissatisfaction with liberalism, and the concomitant growth of the far left and the far right (both of which deemphasize individualism), stems in part from this inadequacy.9 A
truly persuasive description of gender justice would recognize that
because we are inevitably communal, some moral decisions must be
made communally. The task would then be to outline and defend
particular results against the results proffered by conservatives and
radicals.
Ironically, the authors themselves recognize this dual nature of
humanness in one context: the family. They warn against any policy on family life which "turn[s] the aspiration of individualism into
a too-simple slogan." 10 What these good liberals fail to notice is
that individualism can be elevated into a distorting force outside the
8. Jd. at 23-26.
9. In keeping with their masquerade as neo-Jiberals with something new to offer, the
authors declaim in general terms about the need to recognize more than the primacy of the
individual and individual choice. See, e.g., id. at 65-66, 69. Their more specific suggestions,
however, rely on individual autonomy to the virtual exclusion of any other value.
10. Jd. at 176.
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context of the family as well. II Moreover, in the context of the family, the book advocates certain moral positions beyond the neutral
"individual choice" of the marketplace. They propose that in addition to tolerating and encouraging the diverse family structures that
result from unfettered individual choice, the government ought to
offer economic support to families-but only selectively. They propose that the government should subsidize "those family forms that
offer long term benefits to society," but not "those that promise
only immediate benefits to their present participants," because the
latter, "while doubtless nurturing to the partners, further no strong
societal goal."J2 It is difficult to fathom which family forms might
meet the authors' criteria (the surrounding passages suggest that all
and only those engaged in childrearing would do so), but it is clear
that they are advocating a particular vision of virtuous behavior to
be encouraged and subsidized.
Even if the reader accepts the paradigm of individual choice,
the book's particular translation of it into gender policy suffers from
serious flaws. The authors suggest four "choice-enhancing" elements of "sound gender policy":
Individuals must have the opportunity to choose, the capacity to make choices, information on which to base preferences, and a climate of tolerance in which to explore alternatives.13

These four elements, although they have the ring of a panacea for
gender injustice, essentially reduce to a lack of governmental restraints, prohibitions on overt discrimination by employers and
other organized entities, plus a sufficient economic "safety net" and
a little publicity about equal opportunity.J4 Following the liberal
tradition of Isaiah Berlin, the authors of Gender Justice envision
liberty primarily as "negative liberty" or freedom from restraint; to
the extent that the required capacity to choose encompasses "positive liberty," it does so only in non-gender aspects. The capacity to
choose is enhanced by "assurances that the basic social and economic wants of persons have been satisfied,"1s but such remedies as
guaranteeing a minimum number of positions for women in tradiII. Liberals, of course, are not the only ones who find such distinctions between the
family and the marketplace. See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
12. GENDER JuSTICE, supra note 5, at 175. Thomas Grey has suggested that the
Supreme Court has implicitly adopted this principle insofar as it safeguards from governmental interference any type of relationship which, like the traditional family, serves as a stabilizing force in society. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 83 (1980).
13. GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 135 (emphasis in original).
14. ld. at 131-35.
15. /d. at 133.
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tionally male occupations are not seen as choice enhancing, and are
therefore rejected.I6
Moreover, in a brief, uninformative, and unconvincing discussion of how courts differ from legislatures, the authors conclude
that, in general, positive liberty should be left to legislatures to
impose:
For instance, a court should not condemn government failure to enrich choice by
not supplying free child care for working parents, since whatever the merits of this
idea, failure to implement it does not instance disrespect to individual autonomy
premised on sex.l7

In a society where most of the responsibility for child care falls on
women, limiting their opportunities to participate in the workforce,
it is ignoring reality to say that governmental neglect of the problem
is not an example of "disrespect to individual autonomy premised
on sex."
This narrow description of what constitutes an opportunity
and a capacity to choose reflects a naive and uncritical viewpoint.
The authors fail to explore perhaps the most difficult issue of gender
discrimination: the interaction of societal pressures and individual
choice. For example, in contending that the largely gender-segregated workforce is at least partly the result of individual choice
rather than discrimination, the authors suggest that women choose
certain low-prestige jobs for three reasons. Such work enables women to "shape work around the demands of home life," to "stop
working or work part time while raising a family," and to relocate
easily in order to accommodate their husbands' career paths.1s
There is not even a hint that the individual woman's choice to
subordinate her own life to her husband's (taking over responsibility
for the children and the home) is not, in fact, wholly her own
16. See, e.g., id. at 136, 159-67. The authors engage in the usual semantic games when
they discuss affirmative action, referring to such programs as "quotas." Regardless of the
merits of affirmative action, there is an important distinction between a quota, which limits
the maximum number of women, and most affirmative action programs, which simply guarantee a minimum number of positions available to women. The book's main criticism of
affirmative action is that it is designed "to equalize the distribution of male and female workers throughout the workforce." ld. at 160. This might be true of quotas, but the goal of most
affirmative action programs is simply to ensure that women who have been excluded from
certain occupations in the past are able and encouraged to choose those occupations today,
and that the subtlest vestiges of discrimination are eliminated. The contours of the notion of
ability to choose are discussed in the text.
17. Id. at 112. The authors discuss the role of the courts generally at page 85.
18. Id. at 150-51. While the authors recognize that not all women who are in lowprestige jobs fit this pattern, they do suggest that the women who fit the pattern are making
free choices. Even if true, the discontinuity in employment caused by these family responsibilities accounts for only one-third of the wage gap between white men and white women, and
only one-quarter of the wage gap between white men and black women. G. DUNCAN, YEARS
OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY 161-63 (1984).
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choice. From liberalism's individualist vantage point, any decision
made with sufficient knowledge and a superficial absence of restraints is an individual choice. An approach which integrates individual selves and their social context would find it necessary to
explore the more subtle societal forces that influenced the particular
choice, before concluding that it was the individual's choice.l9
In another passage, the book's failure to recognize the subtleties that lie between individual choice and coercion is even more
explicit. In noting that pervasive discrimination does affect individual choices, the authors suggest that" 'I don't want to' is sometimes
hard to distinguish from 'You can't' ": as the latter diminishes,
choice becomes more open.2o In reality, choice can be as constricted by "You shouldn't," or "You may, but these are the consequences," as by the simple "You can't." Like Richard Posner, the
authors rely on individual choice as the basis for law and morality,
but, like Posner, they have a utopian view of what it means to
choose. 2'
The book also naively overstates the degree to which overt discrimination ("you can't") has been reduced, painting a rosy picture
of an almost gender-neutral society. Chapter two documents the
history of gender discrimination, although with little attention to
detail and devoted largely to distinguishing gender discrimination
from race discrimination. Paternalism toward women, unlike paternalism toward blacks, was motivated by benevolence, and "undertaken with the human worth of women in mind."22 The authors
thus revive the distinction between pedestal and cage, a distinction
long abandoned by all but conservatives and, apparently, their neeliberal imitators.
Moving into the present, the authors find gender discrimination mostly eradicated, maintaining that "[t]he evidence of the past
decade gives cause to believe that, offered the opportunity, men and
women will take more control over their own lives."23 In support
of this statement and of their general attitude that only minimal
changes are necessary to achieve gender justice, the authors rely on
inaccurate and inconsistent "facts." In the context of the market19.

For a brief exploration of this issue in the course of another scholar's review of

GENDER JUSTICE, see Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender
Justice 96 YALE L.J. 914, 931-40 (1987).
20. GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 152. The authors do recognize one way in which

society affects individual choices: where an individual perceives her choices as limited, she
will do less to protect what choices she has. Id. at 146-47.
21. See West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
22. GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 43-44.
23. !d. at 137; see also id. at p. 47.
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place, for example, they allege that "[t]he work force is more sexually integrated in particular fields."24 This conflicts with both their
own statement ten pages later-"[i]n 1980, three-quarters of all women crowded into occupations where women made up a majority of
the work force"2s-and with the findings of other researchers.26
Moreover, despite the fact that they conclude that sex segregation
in the workplace causes "much of the disparity" between men's and
women's wages,21 they do not view either segregation or the wage
gap as cause for concern or for much government intervention.
While flexible or part-time work schedules "appeal[] intuitively to
the proponent of choice," government should not mandate such innovations, because employers will simply circumvent them. Instead, government can offer firms information about flexible
working schedules.2s While "[n]on-discrimination is ... essential
to securing choice," government options to combat discrimination
are similarly limited. In addition to existing proscriptions on overt
discrimination, the authors advocate prohibiting employers from
enforcing dress codes or from discriminating against homosexuals.29 The former is so trivial as to be almost deliberately belittling
of working women's needs; the latter, while a laudable goal, has
little to do with gender discrimination. What government may not
do to combat gender discrimination, according to the authors of
Gender Justice, is mandate or condone either affirmative action programs or comparable worth. Affirmative action is wrong because
"[q]uotas deny the primacy of individuals."3o Comparable worth is
both impossible to achieve and unnecessary: "Reliance on a market
rid of its discriminatory elements enhances individual choice and
equity for men and women more effectively than manipulating the
wage structure."31 These arguments have been made before, but
not often by self-proclaimed liberals and not often so superficially.
In further support of their position that recent gains by women
indicate little further governmental intervention is necessary, the
authors point to a number of changes within the family. "Nearly
one household in seven is now headed by a woman," "[m]ore than
half the populace believes that husbands as well as wives should
ld. at 173.
ld. at 147.
See, e.g., SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS,
REMEDIES (B. Reskin ed. 1984); Beller, Occupational Segregation and the Earnings Gap, in
CoMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 26-27 (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights 1984).
27. GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 147.
28. Id. at 155-56.
29. Id. at 158.
30. Id. at 166; see generally id. at 159-67.
31. Id. at 168-69.
24.
25.
26.
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care for small children," and "[t]here is now overwhelming support
for women who opt to work."32 The phenomenon of women heads
of households has contributed only to the feminization of poverty,
not to the liberation of women.33 The fact that half the population
believes men should have childcare responsibilities does not mean
that very many men fulfill such responsibilities: childcare is still
primarily a woman's responsibility even in two-career families.34
And while there may be popular support for women who work,
even the authors themselves recognize that the crushing burden of
family responsibilities keeps many women from full participation in
the workforce.3s
Gender Justice not only presents a naively optimistic view of
the progress toward equality, it is strikingly unfair to its adversaries.
Presentation of the radical feminist viewpoint ranges from simplistic to deliberately distorted. The authors reduce much of the feminist scholarship to tirades against a male conspiracy: "Marxist
feminists ... explain the earnings gap as a plot by men to retain
their superiority."36 The feminist view of the segregated workforce
is similarly described: "The radical feminist envisions a male plot
to tum women workers into a kind of ladies auxiliary for the human
race."37 This simplistic view is very likely derived from the same
shortcoming that informs the authors' view of women's "choices":
an inability to recognize a spectrum between fully intentional
choices ("plots") and acts utterly beyond control of the individual.
This failure to recognize the mixed nature of prejudice is most
apparent in the authors' brief criticism of the feminist explanation
of segregation in the workplace, employers' prejudice. The authors
suggest that such an explanation "strain[s] credulity":
If one sees men as "homo-social" beings-that is, interested in working with other
men, not women-who have created segregated working conditions in order to associate with one another, the theory acquires a certain bite. Yet this is a coupleoriented, not a "night out with the boys (or girls)," society; why should work and
32. /d. at 137.
33. See, e.g., G.

DUNCAN, supra note 18, at 48-52; L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECfED SociAL AND EcONOMIC CoNSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323-56 (1985).

34. See, e.g., Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: The Example of Housework, 6 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULT. & Soc. 366, 388-93 (1981);
Kay, Legal and Social Impediments to Dual Career Marriages, 12 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV.
207, 220 (1979); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 995-96
n.158 (1984).
35. GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 150-51 (women choose less demanding occupations in order to accommodate family responsibilities); see id. at 190-94 (some type of childcare allowance is necessary).
36. /d. at 145.
37. /d. at 148.
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leisure preferences differ?38

In fact, the prejudice that feminists suggest creates segregated workplaces is not a desire to associate only with one's own gender, it is a
desire to treat as peers only one's own gender. It strains credulity to
believe that the authors of Gender Justice are unaware of this basic
distinction.
Gender Justice is excellently researched, and exhibits an astounding familiarity with the literature in numerous diverse fields.
Despite this, the authors manage to ignore reality in creating their
gender policy.39 They call for vigorous enforcement of current antidiscrimination laws, but oppose policies designed to combat the
more subtle general discrimination that pervades society. Government interference with the forces that influence individual discrimination is kept to a minimum. The only real change suggested is
government encouragement and subsidization of childraising alternatives, but the authors' justification for that policy is less to free
women from the choice-constraining burdens of childrearing than
simply to recognize the reality that most mothers work out of economic necessity: "[P]olicy must contend with the reality that many
children now receive care outside the home."40 Moreover, the suggestion of a cash allowance directly to parents rather than government support of day care is apparently designed to encourage one
parent to stay at home.4I The authors, in keeping with their failure
to recognize that individual choices are heavily influenced by institutionalized discrimination and stereotypes, apparently believe that
which parent chooses to stay home will be a gender-neutral individual decision. In light of the thoroughness and breadth of the authors' knowledge, it is difficult to believe that all these analytical
and informational lapses are inadvertent. In the end, Gender Justice
is little more than an apology for the status quo.
/d. at 149 (footnotes omitted).
Others have noticed that GENDER JusncE also ignores much recent scholarship,
especially feminist scholarship. See Finley, supra note 19, at 914-15; Menkel·Meadow,
Gendered Justice, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 258, 265 (1986).
40. GENDER JumcE, supra note 5, at 193.
41. /d. at 192·94.
38.
39.

